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CASE NOTES
holders and a duty—a fiduciary relationship—flows down not only to
the controlling shareholders but to all the stockholders. A sale of the
directorships is a sale of a corporate asset and, considered as a breach of the
fiduciary duty of these sellers, as directors, should not be countenanced by
the law.
The trend of law today seems to be toward regarding management
control as a corporate asset in which all shareholders have an equitable
interest and in which they are entitled to share. On this basis the Barnes
doctrine and the decision in the present case represent an outmoded view."
Judge Friendly's opinion in the present case is indicative of the modern
approach to the director's increased fiduciary obligations:
. . . developments over the past decades seem to me to show that
such a clause violates basic principles of corporate democracy. . .
A mass seriatim resignation directed by a selling stockholder, and
the filling of vacancies by his henchmen at the dictation of a pur-
chaser and without any consideration of the character of the
latter's nominees, are beyond what the stockholders contemplated
or should have been expected to contemplate. . . . A special meet-
ing of stockholders to replace a board may always be called, and
there could be no objection to making the closing of a purchase
contingent on the results of such an election. 25
THOMAS J. MUNDY, JR.
Corporations—Stockholder's Rights—Inspection of the Corporate Stock
Ledger.—Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. State of Del. ex rel. Porterie.'—
Petitioner, owner of record of one hundred shares of TWA stock, was refused
permission by TWA to inspect its stock ledger. Its refusal was predicated
on the contention that the petitioner was acting solely in behalf of Howard
Hughes' interests which were being sued by TWA in another jurisdiction
in connection with certain loans made to TWA. The airline further contended
that the inspection was sought for the purpose of soliciting stockholder
support for a resolution instigated by Hughes via the petitioner, recom-
mending that it assist Hughes in prosecuting claims against certain !ending
institutions. Such action by TWA's management would result in an aban-
donment of its claims against Hughes, which TWA asserts would be inimical
to the corporation. The Superior Court of Delaware granted a writ of
mandamus permitting a qualified inspection of TWA's stock ledger. On
24 Berle, "Control" In Corporate Law, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1212, 1217 (1958):
A third point of contact is the practically universal prohibition of contracts
by directors to resign, tciting Gerdes case] . . . . The vice therefore of a
director's contract to resign . . . at bottom rests not on the fact that such action
is based on personal motives but on the simple fact that the control function
is being abused. The thrust is quite simply, that directorships may not be
bought and sold.
25 305 F.2d at 581.
I — Del. —, 183 A.2d 174 (1962).
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appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware HELD: Petitioner's qualified right
of inspection of the stock ledger is dependent upon record ownership and
is not defeated by proof that the inspection is sought for the purpose of
thwarting TWA's claim against Hughes.
The issues involved in the litigation between TWA and Hughes were
of no concern to the Delaware court sitting to determine the petitioner's
right to inspect TWA's stock ledger. Therefore, TWA erred in assuming that
since it considered the suit against Hughes to be in the best interests of
the corporation, any purpose designed to defeat TWA's claim would be an
improper purpose. The court determined that any TWA stockholder has
the right to take the position that the suit against Hughes is not beneficial
to the corporation, and since his purpose is germane to his interest as a
stockholder, he cannot be precluded from inspection of the stock ledger
because his position is adverse to that of management.
Under the Delaware Corporation Law, 2 a stockholder's right to examine
the stock ledger is determined solely by record ownership.3 This right has
been founded Upon the proposition that those in charge of the corporation
are merely agents of the stockholders who are the real owners of the prop-
erty.4 Some authorities have gone so far as to equate the stockholder's right
of inspection with that of a member of an ordinary partnership. 5 The
majority of jurisdictions,° including Delaware, have qualified the seemingly
absolute right conferred by the statute by refusing to grant the discre-
tionary writ of mandamus' where the purpose of the inspection was
inimical to the corporation or was sought for purposes unrelated to the
petitioner's status as a stockholder.5 In State ex rel. Theile v. Cities Service
Co.,° the petitioner sought inspection for the purpose of selling stockholder
2 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 220 (1953) provides:
The original or duplicate stock ledger shall be the only evidence as to who
are the stockholders entitled to examine the list required by Section 219 of this
title or the books of the corporation, or vote in person or by proxy at any such
election. The original or duplicate stock ledger containing the names and
addresses of the stockholders, and the number of shares held by them, respec-
tively, shall, at all times, during the usual hours for business, be open to the
examination of every stockholder at its principal office or place of business in
this state, and said original or duplicate stock ledger shall be evidence in all
courts of this state.
3 State ex rel. Healy v. Superior Oil Corp., 40 Del. 460, 13 A.2d 453 (Super. Ct.
1940).
4 Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148 (1905) ; .5 Fletcher, Private Corporations
§ 2213 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1952).
5 Ibid.
6 E.g., Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 155, § 22 (1959) ; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 53, § 34
(1954) ; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 294, § 92 (1955); N.J. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 5-1 (1939);
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 2852-308 (1958); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 461 (1958).
7 State ex re!. Miller v. Loft, Inc., 34 Del. 538, 156 Atl, 170 (Super. Ct. 1931);
Firestone, Rights of Stockholders to Compel Leave to Inspect Books of a Delaware
Corporation, 30 Mich. L. Rev. 769 (1932).
8 Ballantine, Corporations § 160 (rev. ed. 1946); State ex rel. Theile v. Cities
Service Co., 31 Del. (1 Harr.) 346, 114 At!. 463 (1921), aff'd, 31 Del. (1 Harr.) 514,
115 Atl. 773 (1922); State ex rel. Foster v, Standard Oil Co. of Kan., 41 Del. 172, 18
A.2d 235 (Super. Ct. 1941).
a Supra note 8.
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lists for profit. The court stated that "the right given to the stockholder
by the statute to inspect the company's books is given to him as a stock-
holder and is to be exercised by him qua such."" Hence, in cases involving
denial of stockholder inspection privileges, the determination is dependent
upon the propriety of the purpose of the inspection.
In Insuranshares Corp. v. Kirchner," the Delaware Supreme Court
granted a stockholder the right of inspection although the purpose was to con-
duct a proxy campaign which the board of directors deemed prejudicial to the
corporation. State ex rel. Foster v. Standard Oil Co. of Kan., 12 illustrates
further the right of a stockholder to use the corporate stock ledger in an
effort to seek support for a program adverse to that advocated by manage-
ment. The petitioner in that case was bringing a derivative suit against the
corporation's president and sought access to the stock ledger for the purpose
of communicating with other stockholders regarding the pending litigation.
The Delaware Supreme Court in its opinion stated "The limitations con-
structively imposed on the right of stockholders to examine stock ledgers
ought not be so extended as to keep stockholders in ignorance of matters
in which they are vitally interested."" The Insuranshares, Foster and TWA
cases demonstrate that a distinction must be drawn between a purpose which
is against the views of management and a purpose which is against the best
interests of the corporation. The mere fact that a stockholder's purpose
is advocation of a policy contrary to that endorsed by management does
not render that purpose harmful, inimical or improper per se.
While originally, in Delaware, the burden of proof was on the stockholder
to demonstrate a proper purpose,H the burden of proof is now placed upon
the corporation to show that the purpose of the stockholder, in seeking
inspection, is not pertinent to his status as a stockholder or is otherwise
improper.'' While Deleware has thus expanded the stockholder's right of
inspection," certain other jurisdictions have recently legislated in the
opposite direction. Restrictions have been imposed by statutes requiring
certain conditions precedent to the stockholder's otherwise absolute right
to inspect the stock ledger. For example, the stockholder must have been
an owner of record for a specified minimum period of time; 17
 or must have
owned a stipulated percentage of the outstanding stock." However, in spite
10 Id. at 521, 115 Ati. at 776.
11 40 Del. 105, 5 A.2d 519 (1939).
12 supra note S.
13 Id. at 177, 18 A.2d at 239.
14 Henn, Corporations § 201 (1961) ; State ex rel. Miller v. Loft, Inc., supra note 7.
15 Supra note 11.
113 Supra notes 11, 12 & accompanying text.
17 E.g., ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act § 46 (1953) (6 months) ; Ala. Code
tit. 10, § 21(46) (Supp. 1961) (6 months) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. tit. 34, § 608.39 (1956)
(6 months) ; Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 51 (1957) (6 months); Mich. Stat. Ann, ch.
450, § 45 (1948) (3 months) ; Miss. Gen. Acts Adv. Sheets § 50 (1962) (6 months);
N.Y. Stock Corp. Law ch. 59, § 10 (1951) (6 months); S.C. Corp. Law § 626 (eff.
1-1-64) (6 months).
18 E.g., ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act § 46 (1953) (5%); Ala. Code tit. JO,
§ 21(46) (Supp. 1961) (5%); Fla. Stat. Ann. fit. 34, § 608.39 (1956) (1%) ; Md. Ann.
Code art. 23, § 51 (1957) (5%) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. ch. 450, § 45 (1948) (2%); Miss.
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of these restrictions, most statutes permit courts, in their discretion, to
order inspection provided the stockholder can demonstrate that his purpose
is proper. 19
 Thus, in such cases, unlike Delaware, the burden remains upon
the stockholder. Several states have followed New York" in requiring
that the stockholder execute an affidavit stating that such information is
not sought for a purpose unrelated to the corporate business and that he
has not sold such lists or aided others in procuring such lists in the past 21
Such restrictive provisions are not entirely without justification. In
many instances they have obviated the possibility of common abuses.
Previously, inspection could be gained by the acquisition of a minimum
number of shares of stock to be used for various improper purposes. So-called
"sucker lists" of stockholders were compiled and sold for profit. 22 Corpora-
tions were unwarrantedly subjected to harassment by stockholders." In-
spection also was sought to "fish" for litigable claims against the corpora-
tion and to serve other interests hostile to the corporation?;
Finally, there are two additional considerations suggesting that the
restrictive trend is warranted. First, the rights of the stockholder who is
cognizant of the purposes for which the inspection is sought are more easily
safeguarded than the rights of a corporation which is generally unaware of
and unable to ascertain the true purpose of the inspection. Thus, the
burden of proof upon the stockholder under the restrictive-type statutes
is much more easily sustained than the burden of proof upon the corporation
under the Delaware-type statutes. Second, the legislatures revising their
corporation laws are faced with two countervailing policy considerations.
On the one hand, the stockholder as a part owner of the corporation is
entitled to inspect the corporate stock ledger. On the other hand, the
corporation and its stockholders must be protected from abuses of the
right of inspection. In a compromise between these sometimes conflicting
interests, the legislatures have proceeded upon the basis that these restric-
tions will not deny the stockholder with a proper purpose the right to
inspect the stock ledger; 23 but they will prevent harm being incurred by
the corporation to a greater extent than was previously possible by denying
Gen. Acts Adv. Sheets § 50 (1962) (1%) ; N.Y. Stock Corp. Law ch. 59, § 10 (1951)
(5%) ; S.C. Corp. Law § 626 (eff. 1-1-64) (5%).
19 E.g
., ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act § 46 (1953); Ala. Code tit. 10, § 21(46)
(Supp. 1961); Fla. Stat. Ann. tit. 34, § 608.39 (1956); Miss. Gen. Acts Adv. Sheets
§ 50 (1962); S.C. Corp. Law § 626 (eff. 1-1-64).
20 N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 10 (1951).
21 See, e.g., S.C. Corp. Law § 626 (eff. 1-1-64). Several jurisdictions require only
a written demand setting forth the purpose of the inspection: e.g., ABA-ALI Model Bus.
Corp. Act § 46 (1953); Ala. Code tit. 10, § 21(46) (Supp, 1961); Md. Ann. Code art. 23,
§ 51 (1957) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. ch. 450, § 45 (1948) ; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. tit. 17,
§ 37 (1958).
22 See S.C. Bus. Corp. Act (Draft Version), p. 124 (1962).
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Some jurisdictions go further to provide that a stockholder who has been
unjustly refused access may recover a penalty assessed against the corporation for
such denial equal to a percentage of the value of the stockholder's shares in such
corporation. E.g., ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act § 46 (1953) (10%), Ala. Code
tit. 10, § 21(46) (Supp. 1961) (10%) ; Miss. Gen. Acts Adv. Sheets § 50 (1962) (10%).
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inspection where the stockholder cannot demonstrate his purpose to be
proper.
However, it is submitted that even in a jurisdiction having a restrictive-
type statute, assuming conditions precedent fulfilled, the result would be
the same, for clearly a stockholder has the right to take a side, seek the
support of other stockholders and express his views to the corporation,
though they are in conflict with those of management.
NELSON G. Ross
Fair Trade—Non-Signer Clauses—Standing to Sue: Contract or Tort.
—Gillette Co. v. Master. 1—Gillette brought an action to enjoin Master from
selling Gillette's products at prices below those set out in fair trade minimum
price contracts= between Gillette and other retailers. Defendant questioned
the ability of the plaintiff to bring suit arguing that the alleged violation
sounded in contract, and that because of this Gillette was precluded from
bringing the action since it had neither registered for a Certificate of
Authority,' nor paid the $250 penalty fee. 4 Gillette argued that since the
action was based on tort' its standing to sue was unaffected by the fact that
it had not obtained a Certificate of Authority. Each party based its argu-
ment on its interpretation of Section 2 of the Pennsylvania Fair Trade Act.e
The parties stipulated that should the court find that Gillette had standing
1 408 Pa. 202, 182 A.2d 734 (1962).
See Pa. Stat. Ann, tit. 73, § 7 (1960). Section 7 provides in part:
No contract relating to the sale or resale of a commodity which bears, or the
label or content of which bears, or the vending equipment from which said
commodity is sold to the consumer bears the trade-mark, brand or the name
of the producer or owner of such commodity, and which is in fair and open
competition with commodities of the same general class produced by others,
shall be deemed in violation of any law of the State of Pennsylvania by
reason of any of the following provisions which may be contained in such
contract:
(a) That the buyer will not resell such commodity, except at the price
stipulated by the vendor.
(b) That the buyer of such commodity require upon his resale of such
commodity that the purchaser from him agree that such purchaser will not in
turn resell except at the price stipulated by the vendor of the buyer.
3 Pa. Stat. Ann, tit. 15, § 2852-1001 (1958).
4 Pa. Stat. Ann, tit. 15, § 2852-1014 (1958).
5 Brief for Appellant, p. 13.
6 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, § 8 contains the relevant portion of section 2, Act of 1935,
P.L. 266:
Wilfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale, or selling any commod-
ity at less than the price stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant to the
provisions of section one of this act, whether the person so advertising, offering
for sale, or selling is or is not, a party to such contract, is unfair competition
and is actionable at the suit of such vendor, buyer or purchaser of such
commodity.
Gillette stressed that part of the statute which stated that the offense "is unfair com-
petition and is actionable," while Master stressed "in any contract entered into .
whether the person . 	 . is, or is not, a party to such contract, .	 . is actionable."
(Emphasis supplied.)
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